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The transition of Poland to a free market economy, concurrent to a substantial increase of the 
private sector, promoted entrepreneurship, joint ventures, self-employment, labor reallocation, 
growth of financial markets and direct foreign investments. Previous studies have provided 
inconclusive evidence regarding earning disparities in Poland. The present study proposes a 
model that employs demographic, employment and organizational characteristics, revealing that 
earnings in the private sector are 9.8% higher than in the public sector; human capital 
characteristics are more influential in the private than in the public sector; the return to general 
training is higher for both workers with a higher education and those in the private sector; and the 
return to firm-specific-training is higher in the private sector. The results are discussed in light of 
the structure of a transitional economy and the changing labor market.  
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Introduction 
Economies in transition must contend with a long period of adjustment to free labor markets. 
Moving from an almost totally centralized economy to a free market economy led to a sharp 
increase of the private sector by joint ventures, entrepreneurships, financial markets, and influx 
of foreign investments. Nevertheless, it raises basic questions in regard to wage determination, 
the negotiation process, how to persuade high quality workers from the public sector to move to 
private firms, and so on. In contrast to the classic conventional market economy model, 
suggesting that financial incentives e.g. wages, profit sharing, stock options, are the motivators to 
move to the private sector, the Polish economic system experienced problems of trust and 
stability during the transition. Thus workers in the public sector were reluctant to give up tenure 
and move to the private sector, which is characterized by higher risks. Not only is there an 
economic change involved in the transition, but also a cultural change in the workers' perceptions 
of the new and unfamiliar system. One of the key questions that emerge in the course of such a 
change is whether or not the private sector which is profit-driven should pay a premium to its 
workers that they do not receive in the public sector. 
 Following the collapse of communism, Poland’s economic transformation was initially 
characterized by a rapid growth in private sector employment and an increased number of self-
employment,
1
 concurrent with a sharp rise in the national level of unemployment and widening 
inequalities in earnings. This might indicate a reallocation of labor resulting from a new process 
of wage determination. However, empirical studies attempting to identify the wage differences 
between the two sectors have not been sufficiently comprehensive. Although they shed some 
light on the distribution of earnings by sectors, the results are far from conclusive.  
 The aim of this paper is three-fold: (1) to identify the factors determining earnings in the 
Polish labor market; (2) to identify differences in earning levels between the private and public 
sectors; (3) and to compare the factors affecting wage determination in the two sectors. 
Addressing these issues we consider questions of: (1) ownership and its effects on earnings; (2) 
privatization and earnings; (3) possible consequences for self-employment, emerging new 
ventures and entrepreneurs. The latter is a very important question not only for economies in 
transition, but also for almost all developing countries and some developed countries. 
 
I. Wage Determination in a Market Economy 
 One of the questions firms are preoccupied with are the wages paid to its employees. 
Since the Polish private sector has been development mainly by entrepreneurial activities and 
privatization of state ownerships, the question of relative wages between the private sector versus 
the public sector is of most importance to the Polish economy. No single theoretical framework 
yet exists for wage formation in both industrialized and transitional economies. The literature 
typically offers two opposing approaches (see: Polachek and Siebert 1996).
2
 The first relates to a 
competitive labor market, and suggests that wages are determined by adjusting for the supply and 
demand of labor. The second approach refers to the non-competitive (non-clearing) view of wage 
formation. The competitive labor market theory implies that after controlling for differences in 
labor quality and workplace characteristics, the only gaps between the compensation of 
                                                          
1
  The share of the private sector in employment was about 730% in 2000 (22% of them are self-employed)1999, 
1999but the public sector was still a very large employer, accounting for 50.1%23% of total salaried workers, 
particularly those in highly skilled, managerial and professional positions. 
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employees in different sectors should reflect differences in the opportunity costs of employment 
across sectors.  
 
 Three theoretical models are suggested in the literature of labor economics to explain the 
fact that different firms or industries do not pay the same wages to comparable workers (Krueger 
and Summers 1988).
3
 These are: (1) agency theories (some enterprises are not profit 
maximizers); (2) efficiency theories (higher-than-market level wages contribute to higher 
productivity); and (3) bargaining theories (union or insider’s power). Yet despite the attempts to 
account for observed differences, existing empirical evidence does not provide sufficient support 
for either the theory of competitive wage determination or for non-clearing wage determination 
to establish a consensus among researchers. Indeed, there is even conflicting evidence as to 
which sector (public or private) pays higher wages
4
.
2
 
 
A. Wage Determination in Transitional Economies 
 Why should private entrepreneurships and joint ventures companies, in a transitional 
economy pay higher wages than state companies for workers with comparable characteristics and 
skills? Standard competition theory (see Polachek and Siebert 1996, ch. 7)
5
 explains such 
discrepancies in earnings by means of the theory of compensating differences, i.e., the 
differences in the non-pecuniary job attributes and working conditions (including the 
disadvantages of certain jobs) between the public and private sectors. Workers, especially older 
ones, may dislike working in private sector firms, which impose stricter supervision of their 
effort (particularly in small and medium-sized firms), non-standard employment contracts, longer 
working hours, and lower job security (which is subject to fluctuations in product demand, etc.). 
 Earning gaps may also reflect differences in the nature of compensation packages in the 
sectors, with the public sector in former communist countries typically offering more fringe 
benefits.  Furthermore, in terms of agency theory, some public economic units that provide 
public goods are not profit maximizers, and employee remunerations are determined by non-
market considerations, such as civil servant salary scales. As an employer, the government can 
also constrain earning increases in the public sector and impose formal or discretionary measures 
to control wages, in contrast to the free competition in the private sector. For instance, in Poland, 
implementation of the tax-based income policy, linking tax payments to the average wage 
increase within a firm, gave managers an incentive to hire especially low-paid workers to avoid 
taxation.
3
  On the other hand, as the present government in Poland was formed as a result of the 
actions of the labor movement against the previous regime, political pressure from workers in the 
state sector may lead to a relaxation of some of the financial constraints imposed upon state 
enterprises during the stabilization and transformation of the economy.  
 State-owned enterprises also differ in their motivation to pay their employees higher 
wages than those paid in private enterprises. Some operate in a non-competitive environment, 
                                                          
2
  For instance, in Australia (Borland et al. 1998) the average weekly earnings in the public sector are significantly 
higher than in the private sector due to differences in employee characteristics. Differences in the rate of return to 
human capital characteristics, however, show higher earnings for private sector employees. In Turkey, Tansel (1999) 
found that the wages of male workers in public administration are at parity or lower than their private sector 
counterparts, and that wages in state-owned enterprises are higher than in private firms. 
3
  From the beginning, firms with foreign capital were exempted from the tax, and public services paid out of the 
state budget were subject to special regulations. In 1991, private sector firms were exempted from the tax, and the 
wage tax was reduced by 50% for joint stock companies owned by the State Treasury. 
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enjoying the status of a monopoly (utilities, telecommunications, insurance services, etc.), while 
others behave like labor-managed firms. Prior to restructuring and privatization, managers in 
worker-dominated enterprises had little incentive to act in favor of profitability, as their worker 
councils and trade unions strongly opposed layoffs. On the whole, the public sector is 
characterized by a higher rate of unionization, the wage scale is more centralized, and wages are 
not as flexible as in the private sector.
4
 
 
B The Impact of Private Sector Development on Earnings 
 The labor market is generally viewed as a dynamic mechanism, with workers 
continuously flowing into and out of the private sector enterprises and joint ventures, which 
succeed or fail in their operation, on the one hand, and state ownership companies on the other 
hand. The effects of privatization on wage determination must thus be examined. The transition 
of the Polish economy led to a marked decrease in both output and employment in the public 
sector (with the latter lagging behind the former), along with a rapid expansion of the private 
sector. During such a transformation, earnings in the expanding private sector can be expected to 
be higher than in the contracting public sector, as a result of greater productivity.  
 Another explanation for the higher earnings in the private sector is the slow process of 
restructuring and lower level of productivity in state firms (with an accompanying decline in the 
demand for labor). This in contrast to higher efficiency in the private sector due to more 
advanced technology and higher employee motivation. In the first stage of the transition, workers 
with the highest entrepreneurial skills and human capital tend to leave state enterprises and start 
their own businesses or to become self-employed. Private companies are then forced to recruit 
new employees, mainly from the pool of the unemployed and new entrants into the labor market. 
In order to attract workers with a higher level of human capital away from state firms, they offer 
higher wages.  Restrictions on entry into the public sector, due to reductions in its labor force, 
then enhance the power of employees with high skills and long tenure (insiders) in respect to the 
determination of wages in state-owned enterprises. Consequently, rises in value-added per 
employee in these firms may be absorbed directly into the wages of those already employed by 
them, rather than into new investments which would create more jobs. Finally, earning 
differentials between state and private sector employees may reflect differences in working 
conditions and characteristics that influence productivity.  
 
C. Empirical Evidence 
 In recent years, researchers have shown an increased interest in earning distribution in 
post-communist countries.
5
  Studies have uncovered four major facts regarding these economies: 
                                                          
4
  In Poland, the trade unions, which are sharply divided along political lines, fight to protect wages, jobs, and social 
benefits, competing for new members by escalating their claims. The private sector, on the other hand, is 
characterized by a large number of small and medium-sized companies, with no, or significantly less powerful, trade 
unions. In November 1998, 60% of private sector employees and 99.2% of the self-employed worked in enterprises 
with less than 50 workers (author’s calculations based on Polish Labor Force Survey). 
5
  See:  Adamchik and Bedi (2000);  Arjun Bedi (1998);, “Sector Choice, Multiple Job Holding and Wage 
Differentials: Evidence from Poland," The Journal of Development Studies 35 (October 1998): 162-179; E.  
Brainerd (1998), “Winners and Losers in Russia’s Economic Transition,” American Economic Review 88 (5:1988): 
1094-1116; R.S.;  Chase (1998);  , “Market for Communist Human Capital: Returns to Education and Experience in 
the Czech Republic and Slovakia,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 3 (1998): 401-423; T.Eriksson, J. 
Gottvald and P. Mrazek, “Managerial Pay Determinants – Czech Evidence” (Paper presented at 10th  Annual EALE 
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1) earning inequalities have increased compared to the period before the transition; 2) the rate of 
return to education is increasing while the rate of return to experience has decreased;
9 
3) wage 
inequalities are higher in the private sector, where a certain premium has been emerging after 
controlling for labor market employee characteristics,
610
 and 4) gender wage differentials exist in 
favor of men.  
 Aggregated statistics show a significantly lower level of average monthly wages in the 
private than in the public sector. However, this gap has been closing gradually in recent years, 
from 0.80 in 1993 to 0.87 in 2000. 
 More rigorous Empirical studies of wage determination in the Polish economy have 
found that the average earnings in the private sector are higher than in the public sector, with a 
certain wage premium in the private sector was identified by Rutkowski (1996; 1997),
11
 Newell 
and Socha (1998),
12
 and Bedi (1998),.
13
 and Adamchik and Bedi (2000). However, the size of the 
premium found in these studies was different.  
 Rutkowski (1996; 1997) found a significant rise in the rate of return to education, from 
5% in 1987 to 7-8% in 1992-1996. In the private sector, each additional year of schooling yielded 
a 0.8%-0.9% higher return than in the public sector. Experience also incurred a higher rate of 
return in the private sector – 0.6% over the public sector.  In contrast to Rutkowski’s results, 
Newel and Socha (1998) demonstrated that in 1996, workers employed in the private sector (with 
the exception of university graduates) earned less than workers in the public sector on an hourly 
basis. Male university graduates employed in the private sector received 73.2% more than men 
with only a primary school education, as compared to 65.2% in the public sector.. When 
experience, tenure, and firm size were included in the analysis, an earning premium for private 
sector workers was found (men: = 0.093 and = 0.096; women: = 0.053 and = 0.102, in the 
public and private sectors, respectively).  
 Rutkowski (1996; 1997) and Newell and Socha (1998) used standard Mincerian type of 
earning equation estimated by OLS, while Bedi and Adamchik (2000) and Bedi (1998) employed 
a switching regression model that includes employee’s choice of sector to estimate earning 
differences. Bedi found, that after controlling for differences in personal characteristics on 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Conference, 17-20 September, 1988, Blankenberge, Belgium); R.J. Flanagan (1995), “Wage Structures in the 
Transition of the Czech Economy” (Working Paper 95/36, International Monetary Fund); D.C. Jones and T. Kato, 
“The Determinants of Chief Executive Compensation in Transitional Economies: Evidence from Bulgaria,” Labor 
Economics 3 (1966): 319-336; Ch. Kroncke and K. Smith, “Gender Wage Differences During the Transition Period 
in Estonia” (Paper presented at the 10th  Annual EALE Conference 17-20 September, 1998, Blankenberge, 
Belgium);  Keane and Prasad (2002);  A. Krueger and J-S. Pischke (1995);  , “A Comparative Analysis of East and 
West German Labor Markets: Before and After Unification,” Differences and Changes in Wage Structures, ed. R.B. 
Freeman and F. Katz (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995); D.V. Nesterova and K.Z. Sabirianova, 
“Investment in Human Capital Under Economic Transformation in Russia” (Economic Education and Research 
Consortium Working Paper Series No 99/04, Moscow, December 1998); A. Newell (2001);  A. Newell and B. Reilly 
(1999);  , “The Gender Wage Gap in Russia,” Labor Economics 3 (1996): 337-356; A. Newell A. and M.W. Socha 
(1998), “Wage Distribution in Poland: The Roles of Privatization and International Trade, 1992-1996,” Economics 
of Transition 6 (1998): 47-65; R.;  Noorkoiv, P. Orazem, A. Puur, and M. Vodopivec (1997), “How Estonia’s 
Transition Affected Employment and Wages (1989-1995),” (Working Paper No. 1837, World Bank, 1977); P.; 
Orazem P.and M. Vodopivec (1995); , ”Winners and Losers in Transition: Returns to Education, Experience, and 
Gender in Slovenia,” World Bank Economic Review 9 (1995): 201-230; J. Planovsky (1999); and , “Wage 
Developments in the Post-transitional Slovak Economy” (Paper presented at the 11th Annual EALE Conference, 23-
26 September, 1999, Regensburg, Germany); J. Rutkowski (1996; 1997).,  
6
  After reviewing earlier literature on wage determination in post-communist economies, Svejnar (1999, p. 2834) 
concludes that the evidence that private firms pay higher wages is mixed and relates only to some countries.  
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motivating sector choice, monthly earnings in the private sector were 17% higher than in the 
public sector. Adamchik and Bedi found expeciallya large wage gap between private and public 
sectors for workers with university diplomas. The so-called conditional wage obtained by male 
worker with 5 years experience and university education in the private sector is higher by 18% 
(for females this advantage isas compared to  23% for females. 
 
II. Model and Data 
A. A Model of Wage Determination 
 The present study is based on a model different from those employed in previous studies. 
It proposes an a-priori  sequential order of characteristics for the determination of earnings in the 
labor market (Weisberg and Socha, 2002). It relies on the assumption that the different 
organizational settings, industries, and sectors of the economy in which workers are employed 
may have a differential impact on their wage level, in addition to the factors previously studied. 
For example, firms that earn more profits are able to pay higher wages, and thereby attract 
workers who can produce a higher quality of work. The research model and its sequential 
components appear in Figure 1. 
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 The first “block” contains demographic variables, which are the characteristics of workers 
that represent their human capital value in the labor market and for which they wish to be 
compensated. Additional characteristics that relate to some sort of discrimination in the labor 
market, such as gender, are also included here. The second “block” contains the employee’s 
employment background, which adds further information about the workers, such as work 
experience. The third “block” contains characteristics of the employee in the current job, such as 
tenure. The fourth “block” suggests that ALL the previous “blocks” can have a different impact 
on various firms e.g. firm size. The fifth “block” suggests that ALL the previous “blocks,” even 
if identical, will operate differentially in the labor market in the private and public sectors. 
 
B. Earnings Function 
 Drawing on the logarithmic wage function of Mincer (1974),
14
 the level of earnings was 
transformed into ln earnings. We then formulated the following earnings function: 
 
ln (earnings) = c + Σ  ai * Hi + Σ  bi * Oi + Σ ci * M +d * O + f * LM + e 
 
where: 
 
Hi =    demographics and human capital (education, gender, age, 
age
2
, marital status) 
Oi =    employment background (occupation, number of years of 
work, past unemployment periods) 
M =    current job characteristics (number of hours of work per 
week, job status: permanent vs. temporary) 
O =    organizational characteristic (firm size) 
LM =   labor market affiliation (public vs. private sector) 
ai, bi, ci, d, f =  coefficients 
c =    constant 
e =    error term 
 
C. Method 
 Sample: Available data in the Polish labor market showed problems of data collection 
and reliability (Socha and Weisberg, 1999). Nevertheless, data from the Polish Central Statistical 
Office appears to be the best reliable source. Accordingly, the data for our study was drawn from 
the Polish Labor Force Survey (LFS) of November 1995, including 54,800 respondents, of which 
31,480 (about 57%) participate in the labor market (whether employed or unemployed). A sub-
sample of 20%, (6,296) of the 31,480 employed workers was selected randomly (by an SPSS 
procedure). Since some of the workers in the sample did not know to which sector they belonged, 
and others were reluctant to disclose their earnings, they had to be excluded, leaving 3,780 
employees in the final sample.
7
  However, a comparison between the final sample and those who 
were excluded shows, that both groups display similar characteristics.  
                                                          
7
  The relatively small percentage of respondents who completed the question regarding the nature of their employer 
as private or public sector resulted mainly from the ambiguity of firm ownership, due particularly to the manner of 
the privatization process in Poland. 
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D. Variables 
 Data included variables relating to demographic features, past and current employment, 
organizational characteristics and sector affiliation, and earnings. The dependent variable was 
defined as the salaries earned by Polish employees in November 1995.
8
  In accordance with the 
model in Figure 1, the independent variables were classified into five groups: (1) demographic 
and human capital variables, including age, gender, marital status, and education; (2) 
employment background variables, including type of job, past unemployment, and work 
experience; (3) current job variables, including tenure, number of working hours, and years of 
employment in current job; (4) organizational factor, consisting of firm size; and (5) sector 
affiliation, dichotomized into private or public sector. 
 
III. Empirical Results 
A. Bi-variate Analysis 
 Table 1 shows the mean values of each variable included in the model for the total sample 
and for the public and private sectors separately. The results of T-test analyses show whether the 
difference between the two sectors is significant for each variable. Finally, the correlation of the 
independent variables with earnings is presented for the total sample, and for each of the two 
sectors. 
 The bi-variate analyses presented in Table 1 show the significant correlations between the 
independent variables and earnings, along with the differences between the private and the public 
sector. We then conducted a multivariate analysis on earnings in the Polish labor market in order 
to identify the factors which have an impact on determining salaries, as well as to compare the 
process of salaries determination in the two sectors. What we were attempting to find was the 
answer to the key question in this study: Are earnings higher/lower in the private/public sector 
after controlling for variables with a bearing on the level of salaries in the labor market.  
 
B. Multivariate Regression 
 The hierarchical regression analysis employed the five categories ("blocks") of variables 
which were entered into the regression equation sequentially according to our model (see Figure 
1). 
 The results of the regression analysis appear in Table 2, and show the total explained 
variance of the regression to be 34.6%. 
 In the first group (block) of demographic and human capital variables, which contributed 
25.5% to the total explained variance, age correlates positively (β= .465) and significantly with 
earnings, while age
 relates negatively to earnings (β = -.538). Men earn more than women (β = -
.295), and married workers significantly more (β = .062) than single workers. Finally, the higher 
the education, the higher the earnings (β= .164 for university graduates and β= -.162 for primary 
school education; secondary school education was not found to correlate significantly with 
earnings).  
                                                          
8
  Average gross monthly wages and salaries in 1995 was 690,92 zloty, of which 560,67 zloty were net earnings. 
Earnings are comprised of wage rates and basic salaries, premiums, bonuses (e.g., for seniority, serving in 
management positions, etc.), remuneration for overtime, paid lay-offs, holidays, sick pay, allowances and claims 
benefits, payments out of profit, and other forms of compensation. 
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 For the second block of employment background variables, the contribution to the total 
explained variance was 3.2%.  Managers and professionals were found to correlate positively and 
significantly with earnings (β= .153), and  low- and unskilled jobs yielded a negative relationship 
(β= -.090) with earnings. Skilled workers and the technical and clerical occupational group 
produced no significant relationship with earnings.  Past unemployment was found to have a 
significantly negative effect on earnings (β= -.052), while a significant positive effect was found 
for the number of years of work experience in the labor market (β= .198).  
 The third block of variables, relating to current job, contributed 1.7% to the total 
explained variance. Tenure yielded a significant effect on earnings (β= -.057), as did the number 
of working hours per week (β= .115). No significant effect was found for years of employment 
with current employer.  
 The fourth block of variables, representing the organizational characteristic of firm size, 
contributed 3.5% to the total explained variance and showed that working in a large firm has a 
significant and positive effect on earnings (β= .155), whereas working in a small company has a 
significant negative effect (β= -.089 and β= -.063 for 1-5 and 6-20 workers, respectively). 
 The last variable included in the analysis – sector affiliation - differentiated between the 
public and private sectors, and yielded a significant and positive impact on earnings (β= .098). 
Thus, after controlling for all the other variables in the equation, earnings in the private sector 
are 9.8% higher than earnings in the public sector.  
 
C. Earning Differences: Private versus Public Sector 
 After determining that, ceteris paribus, earnings are significantly higher in the private 
than in the public sector, we used two separate regression models to analyze the variables that 
influence wage levels in the two sectors. 
 The findings of this analysis indicate that the predictive power of our model (explained 
variance) is stronger in the private sector (37.5%) than in the public sector (33.5%), with a 
smaller number of significant variables. However, it is important to identify the relative 
contribution of each variable group in the model and to measure its differential impact on 
earnings in the two sectors.  The demographic and human capital variables have a sounder 
impact in the private sector since they contributed 30.1% out of the 37.5% total explained 
variance, whereas in the public sector their contribution was relatively smaller – 23.8%, of the 
total explained variance of 33.5%. This is probably due to the fact that the private sector behaves 
in a more rational manner and rewards workers according to their human capital. Table 3 
presents the factors which have the strongest influence on earnings in the two sectors of the 
Polish labor market. 
 For the first block of variables, relating to bio-demographics and human capital, the 
following results were obtained: 
 
Age: Age is virtually synonymous with experience in the labor market, and is one 
measure of firm-specific human capital. It was found to have the strongest impact 
on earnings in the private sector (β= .928), but a weaker impact in the public sector 
β= .357. This suggests that age has a higher rate of return in respect to wages in a 
competitive market, such as prevails in the private sector. 
Education: Education might be considered the employee’s general (as opposed to 
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firm-specific) human capital. Although no significant effect was found for 
secondary school education, post-secondary and primary school education were 
found to have an impact on wage determination in both sectors. For each of these 
two groups, post-secondary and primary school education, the rate of return to 
education is higher in the private sector (β= .193 and β= .167, respectively) than in 
the public sector (β= .159 and β= .140, respectively). In both sectors post-secondary 
education yields a positive (higher) relationship with earnings, whereas primary 
school education reveals a negative relationship, and is associated with lower 
earnings than other education groups.  
Gender: There would appear to be gender discrimination in respect to wages in 
Poland. Men earn more than women in both the public and private sectors (β= -.289 
and β= -.292, respectively). 
Marital Status: Married workers get higher wages in the public sector than single 
workers (β= .080). In the private sector the impact of marital status is not 
significant. 
 
The second block of employment background variables yielded the following results: 
 
Work Experience: The number of years of work experience in the labor market 
shows a significant and positive impact only in the public sector (β= .274). 
Surprisingly, no significant effect was found for work experience in the private 
sector. 
Occupation: The rate of return for managers and professionals is higher in the 
public than in the private sector (β= .171 and β= .139, respectively), with public 
sector managers earning more than their private sector counterparts. For low- and 
unskilled workers, earning differences are significant only in the public sector, 
where these people get lower wages (β= -.124). 
Past Unemployment: The number of past periods of unemployment has a 
significant and negative impact (β= -.080) only in the private sector. This means 
that the less history of unemployment a worker has, the higher his or her earnings. 
 
The third block of variables, current employment characteristics, produced the following results: 
 
Work Input: The number of working hours per week has a significant and positive 
impact on earnings only in the public sector (β= .125). Surprisingly, no significant 
impact on earnings was found for this variable in the private sector.  
Job Status: In both sectors, holding a permanent job has a significant impact on 
earnings, with temporary workers reporting lower earnings. 
 
 The fourth block, organizational characteristic, focused on firm size. Very large firms 
(over 100 workers) show a positive impact, meaning that earnings are higher here than in smaller 
firms. This finding is stronger in the public sector (β= .158) than in the private sector (β= .109). 
Small firm size, on the other hand, is a disadvantage in terms of wages in both sectors, and 
particularly in the private sector. 
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IV. Discussion and Conclusions Summary and Conclusions 
A. Main findings 
 This paper attempts to answer one of the most fundamental questions for labor market 
analysis: What is the impact of supply-side factors on the price of labor, and how does firm 
ownership affect earnings in a transitional economy? This is particularly important in economies 
in transition where privatization, foreign investments, entrepreneurships, joint ventures, etc. are 
increasing dramatically. 
 Previous empirical studies conducted in Poland produced equivocal evidence of earning 
differentials between the private and public sectors. Neither Rutkowski (1996; 1997)
17
 nor 
Newell and Socha (1998)
18
 used the techniques that make it possible to distinguish between the 
two sectors in terms of a net earnings premium. Rutkowski focused on the differences in the rate 
of return to education and experience, while Newell and Socha extended this approach to include 
additional characteristics, such as history of unemployment, industrial sector, and firm size. Bedi 
(1998)
19
 and Adamchik and Bedi (2000) assumed, without seriousany discussion, that workers 
have well-specified preferences and free choice with respect to the sector in which they wish to 
work. 
 We took a different approach, proposing a comprehensive model to predict earning 
levels. The model is organized in a sequential order and employs five blocks of variables: 
demographics, employment background, current job, organizational characteristics, and sector 
affiliation. The logic of the sequential model is strongly grounded in the theory of wage 
determination, which maintains that the largest part of variations can be explained by human 
capital factors.  
 The major results of our analysis indicate that, ceteris paribus, earnings in the private 
sector comprised of new entrepreneurships and privatized companies are higher by 9.8% than in 
the public sector. Comparison of the two sectors reveals human capital variables to have a much 
stronger impact on determining wages in the private sector than in the public sector. This means 
that from an economic perspective it is worthwhile for workers to be employed in private firms. 
 The rate of return to general human capital, in the case of higher education, as well as to 
firm-specific human capital, is also higher in the private than in the public sector. The results of 
the statistical analysis indeed indicate that earnings are affected mainly by the variables that 
determine workers' “human capital value” in the labor market. These include age, education, 
gender, and marital status. Furthermore, these factors were found to have a higher impact on 
earnings in the private sector than in the public sector. The finding that private sector workers 
obtain a special wage premium for being employed in a more “competitive” environment than 
workers in the public sector implies that the supply-side forces in wage determination in this 
sector play a rather minor role. On the other hand if public sector workers take into account the 
relative earnings opportunities, they may choose employment in the private firms, or start up 
their own entrepreneurial activity. Self-employment may be especially attractive for new labor 
market entrants. A group of special interest is that of managers and professionals. The surprising 
results showed that they earn higher wages and have a higher rate of return in the public sector as 
compared to their counterparts in the private sector. This finding can be related to two possible 
explanations: first, the larger size of establishments in the public sector, compared to the private 
sector. This is in contrast to compensations for executives in capitalist economies, where firms 
are much larger in the private sector than in the public sector. Second, executives in the Polish 
public sector enterprises have more power to demand higher salaries, even if their firms are less 
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profitable, since state ownership control is less efficient, as compared to privately owned firms. 
 Our major conclusion is that Poland is, in fact, moving from a centralized to a free market 
economy, in which market forces operate according to the dynamics of a classical free market 
economy. However, the existing wage differentials indicate that the country is still in a 
transitional phase, with different mechanisms of wage determination existing in the public and 
private sectors. 
 Our theoretical considerations suggest that wage differences may be related to the 
enterprise ownership that affects its aims and behavior. However we were not able to distinguish 
between various ownership types of firms, i.e. between state-owned enterprises, privatized 
formerly state enterprises and new private firms, which emerged by entrepreneurships and joint 
ventures. Accordingly, we cannot verify the hypothesis that public firms characterized by higher 
union density or firms with stronger bargaining power, pay better. However, we cannot conclude 
that the coverage of union negotiated wages is rather small in both sectors. Additionally, many 
trade unions have been committed to economic reform, directly involved in policy making 
decisions at the national level and did not exploit their power to push wages up.  
 For the same reason we do not have any information on the scale of fringe benefits 
offered by the state and private firms. Available evidence from manufacturing enterprises in the 
first stage of transition (see Estrin et al., a 1995)
20
 show that: (a) social benefits have not been 
greatly reduced in either the state-owned or the privatized firms; and (b) newly emerged private 
firms offer a smaller but significant scale of non-wage benefits and expanding the scale of their 
provision. 
 Lower wages can also reflect the wage controls imposed in public sector organizations 
e.g. education, health, public administration financed by external state budget. However this is 
less relevant to the business enterprises owned by the state. In Polish manufacturing state-owned 
enterprises actual wage increases exceeded the wage norm by a considerable margin, however, 
the most important argument is, that wage levels and wage increases operated at the enterprise 
level and not for the individual worker. Thus constraints are not imposed on individual earnings.  
 It is worth noting that even if wage differentials arise from different, not observed, factors 
or mechanisms, our results give some rationale for changes in public policy in both sectors.   
 
B. Policy Implications 
 We would like to suggest several implications for economic and social policy during 
transition. Since human capital is highly rewarded in the private sector, policy makers would do 
well to support investment in human capital, concurrent with the privatization of the state 
economy, as this may be the best way to raise the nation’s standard of living and efficiency gains. 
Promoting new small businesses, entrepreneurship and self-employment may act as a route out of 
poverty or disadvantage. 
 The return to education in Poland (about 7%-8% for each additional year of schooling) is 
still lower than in countries with a comparable level of economic development. The higher return 
to education in the private sector, and particularly at the university level, may represent an added 
incentive to increase private investment in education.
9
  Policies that affect the employment of an 
                                                          
9
 The lower share of employees with university diplomas in the private sector implies that shifts in employment from 
the public to the private sector will raise the demand for less educated workers, which should put upward pressure on 
their wages. However, we are dealing with the 1995 PLFS, a time when the process of privatization undoubtedly 
contributed to the growing skill intensity in large private companies.  
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educated labor force in the private sector may partially offset the impact of the decline in demand 
for less skilled workers and the rise in structural unemployment due to the implementation of 
skill-biased technology, competition from other countries via foreign trade, or the decreasing size 
of sectors with a large share of low-skilled employees (agriculture and mining being the best 
examples).   
 The downsizing of the public sector will also lead to an increase in average earnings in 
the country, with distributional consequences. Since private sector firms generally pay more for 
workers at both ends of the educational scale, a decrease in the size of the public sector will 
result in an increase in the earnings of those with university, post-secondary, and primary school 
education. 
 Moreover, the pronounced earning differentials between the two sectors indicate that 
private sector wages are strongly linked to external labor market conditions. One reason for this 
may be the greater opportunity for wage bargaining at the enterprise level in the private sector 
(where trade unions are often absent), whereas in the public sector wage determination is 
centralized and more closely linked to state policies. The increasing fragmentation of the labor 
force between employees in the state sector who receive relatively low wages paid out of the 
national budget, and those in the private sector, who enjoy a wage premium, clearly indicates that 
public sector employees suffer more from the transition to a free market economy.  
 Consequently, earning differentials have undoubtedly contributed to the growing social 
discontent and political populism of recent years.  Although they reflect an ongoing process of 
restructuring, there is a danger that wage disparities may lead to chronic disparities in living 
standards, and therefore undermine the sustainability of economic transformation. Moreover, 
because of the relatively low salaries paid in public sector organizations, workers may have little 
interest in their restructuring, thereby limiting the flexibility of the internal labor market.  
 Finally, from the perspective of macroeconomic policy, higher wages in the private sector 
may force public sector managers to raise wages in order to attract skilled workers, even when 
this is not justified by increased productivity, but comes at the expense of profits. This practice 
is, in fact, very common in certain industries, such as mining. A higher growth in wages than in 
labor productivity can fuel wage inflation.     
 The new model employed in our study thus provides clear evidence of wage differentials 
in Poland. It remains to be seen whether these will have a positive or negative effect as the 
country continues its transition to a free market economy. 
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 Table 1 
 
Mean, Correlation with Earnings and T-Test Analysis for Total Sample, Public and Private Sectors 
 
 
 Total Sample (N= 3780) Public (N= 2516) Private (N= 1230) T-test between Sectors 
VARIABLES Mean  
 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
Mean  
 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
Mean  
 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
F-Value Significant 
Demographic Variables: 
Age 37.996 0.145 39.291 0.142 35.312 0.152 125.46 .000 
Gender (Male= 1; Female = 2) 1.47 -0.215 1.503 -0.240 1.389 -0.189 43.91 .000 
Marital Status (Single = 0; Married= 1). 0.764 0.117 0.795 0.134 0.702 0.092 40.13 .000 
Education (High) 0.176 0.266 0.211 0.241 0.102 0.362 69.12 .000 
Education (Secondary) 0.328 0.003
+
 0.347 -0.018
+
 0.287 0.039
+
 13.80 .000 
Education (Primary) 0.496 -0.204 0.441 -0.178 0.611 -0.258 97.65 .000 
Employment Background: 
Occupation (Managers & Professionals) 0.170 0.266 0.207 0.237 0.093 0.372 77.31 .000 
Occupation (Technical & Clerical)  0.324 -0.068 0.336 -0.074 0.299 -0.063 5.16 .023 
Occupation (Skilled) 0.274 -0.008
+
 0.220 0.050 0.388 -0.085 120.98 .000 
Occupation  (Operators & Unskilled) 0.231 -0.153 0.237 -0.192 0.220 -0.093 1.40 .236 
Past Unemployment (No. of Periods) 0.240 -0.109 0.144 -0.116 0.453 -0.099 213.89 .000 
Work Experience (Years) 17.380 0.147 18.602 0.167 14.847 0.119 113.31 .000 
 Table 1 (Continued) 
 
Mean, Correlation with Earnings and T-Test Analysis for Total Sample, Public and Private Sectors  
 
 Total Sample (N= 3780) Public (N= 2516) Private (N= 1230) T-test between Sectors 
VARIABLES Mean  
 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
Mean  
 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
Mean  
 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
F-Value Significant 
Current Job 
Tenure (1= Permanent; 2= Temporary) 1.060 -0.095 1.035 -0.089 1.116 -0.101 99.13 .000 
Working Hours (per week) 42.692 0.094 41.893 0.095 44.335 0.108 54.71 .000 
Employment on Current Job (Years) 9.181 0.098 11.489 0.108 4.396 0.093 564.93 .000 
Organization Characteristics 
Firm Size (1-5 Workers) 0.100 -0.104 0.035 -0.075 0.236 -0.133 414.17 .000 
Firm Size (6-20 Workers) 0.177 -0.098 0.119 -0.104 0.298 -0.071 189.98 .000 
Firm Size (21-50 Workers) 0.176 -0.042 0.182 -0.071 0.164 0.004
+
 1.79 .180 
Firm Size (51-100 Workers) 0.119 -0.015
+
 0.135 -0.049 0.085 0.050
+
 19.816 .000 
Firm Size (101+ Workers) 0.427 0.167 0.529 0.180 0.217 0.165 361.26 .000 
Labour Market:  
Sectors (0-Public; 1- Private)   0.325 -0.013 nr nr Nr nr Nr nr 
Earnings 492.002 nr 494.214 nr 486.890 nr .553 .457 
Note:  All correlations were tested by Spearman except age. 
All the Correlations are Significant (p<.05) except those indicated by
(+) 
 Table 2 
Hierarchical Regression Analysis of Earnings in Poland  (Total Sample) 
 
 B Std. Error β T Sig. ΔR(2) 
(Constant) 5.848 0.099  59.114 0.000  
Demographic Variables  25.5% 
Education (High)  0.175 0.022 0.164 7.780 0.000 0.082 
Gender (1- Male, 2- Female) -0.238 0.013 -0.295 -18.941 0.000 0.088 
Education (Elementary) -0.131 0.014 -0.162 -9.128 0.000 0.040 
Age 0.019 0.005 0.465 4.114 0.010 0.028 
AGESQ 0.000 0.000 -0.538 -5.144 0.000 0.012 
Marital status (Single = 0; Married= 1) 0.060 0.015 0.062 3.893 0.003 0.005 
Employment Background 3.2% 
Occupation (Operators & Unskilled) -0.087 0.015 -0.090 -5.714 0.000 0.011 
Work Experience (Years) 0.008 0.003 0.198 5.310 0.000 0.008 
Occupation (Managers) 0.165 0.023 0.153 7.317 0.000 0.007 
Past unemployment (No. of Periods) -0.035 0.010 -0.052 -3.373 0.001 0.006 
 
 Table 2 (Continued) 
Hierarchical Regression Analysis of Earnings in Poland  (Total Sample) 
 
 B Std. Error β T Sig. ΔR(2) 
Current Job 1.7% 
Working hours (per week) 0.006 0.001 0.115 7.502 0.000 0.013 
Job Status (1-permanent 2-temporary) -0.129 0.034 -0.057 -3.808 0.000 0.004 
Organisation Characteristics 3.5% 
Firm Size (101+ workers) 0.125 0.014 0.155 8.949 0.000 0.030 
Firm Size (1-5 workers) -0.130 0.024 -0.089 -5.454 0.000 0.003 
Firm Size (6-20 workers) -0.067 0.018 -0.063 -3.734 0.000 0.002 
Labour Market 0.7% 
Firm Ownership (0-Public, 1- Private) 0.086 0.015 0.098 5.853 0.000 0.007 
 
 R(2) = 34.6% 
 Table 3 
 
Hierarchical Regression Analysis of Earnings in Poland - Public vs. Private Sectors  
 
 PUBLIC PRIVATE 
 B S.E. β t Sig. ΔR(2) B S.E. β t Sig. ΔR(2) 
(Constant) 5.889 0.128  46.087 0.000  5.941 0.145  41.052 0.000  
Demographic Variables 23.8%  30.1% 
Education (High)  0.153 0.025 0.159 6.105 0.000 0.065 0.281 0.048 0.193 5.843 0.000 0.146 
Gender (1- Male, 2- Female) -0.225 0.015 -0.289 -15.058 0.000 0.089 -0.260 0.023 -0.292 -11.237 0.000 0.081 
Education (Elementary) -0.110 0.017 -0.140 -6.432 0.000 0.036 -0.149 0.026 -0.167 -5.699 0.000 0.031 
Age 0.015 0.006 0.357 2.602 0.009 0.028 0.038 0.007 0.928 5.265 0.000 0.026 
Marital status 0.078 0.018 0.080 4.340 0.000 0.014       
AGESQ 0.000 0.000 -0.486 -3.803 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000 -0.841 -4.777 0.000 0.017 
Employment Background 4.1%  2.7% 
Occupation (Operators & 
Unskilled) 
-0.114 0.018 -0.124 -6.314 0.000 0.019      ns 
Work Experience (Years) 0.014 0.002 0.274 6.340 0.000 0.013      ns 
Occupation (Managers) 0.166 0.025 0.171 6.599 0.000 0.005 0.205 0.049 0.139 4.176 0.000 0.016 
Past unemployment (No. of 
Periods) 
-0.024 0.014 -0.032 -1.760 0.078 0.004 -0.047 0.016 -0.080 -3.034 0.002 0.011 
 
  
Table 3 (Continued) 
Hierarchical Regression Analysis of Earnings in Poland - Public vs. Private Sectors 
 
 PUBLIC PRIVATE 
 B S.E. β t Sig. ΔR(2) B S.E. β T Sig. ΔR(2) 
Current Job 1.9%  .5% 
Working hours (per week) 0.006 0.001 0.125 6.705 0.000 0.015       
Job Status (1-permanent 
2-temporary) 
-0.169 0.049 -0.061 -3.422 0.001 0.004 -0.107 0.047 -0.059 -2.280 0.023 0.005 
Organisation Characteristics 3.7%  4.2% 
Firm Size (101+ workers) 0.124 0.016 0.158 7.940 0.000 0.033 0.111 0.031 0.109 3.530 0.000 0.030 
Firm Size (6-20 workers) -0.066 0.023 -0.054 -2.847 0.004 0.002 -0.076 0.029 -0.082 -2.622 0.008 0.008 
Firm Size (1-5 workers) -0.112 0.041 -0.049 -2.752 0.006 0.002 -0.143 0.033 -0.134 -4.364 0.000 0.004 
 
 
 R(2)  = Public Sector =  33.5%; R(2)  = Private Sector = 37.5%. 
 ns = Not Significant 
 
 
 
